Al-Farabi
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Al-Farabi's imagined face
appears on the currency of the Republic of Kazakhstan |
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Name: |
Abū Nasr Muhammad ibn al-Farakh
al-Fārābi[1] |
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Title: |
The Second Teacher[2] |
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Birth: |
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death: |
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Maddhab: |
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Region: |
Central
Asia, Iran, Iraq, Egypt and Syria |
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Main interests: |
Metaphysics,
Political philosophy, Logic, Music, Science(Tabi'iat), Ethics, Mysticism[2], Epistemology and Medicine |
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works: |
Purposes
of Metaphysics of Aristotle[3],
Fosus Al-Hekam, Kitab Mabda’ ara’ ahl
Al-Madina Al-Fadhila,
Counting the
knowledge(Ehsa Al-Ulum),
The Great musics(Al-Musiqi Al-Kabir)[2] |
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Influences: |
Aristotle, Plato, Porphyry, Ptolemy,[citation needed], Al-Kindi |
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Influenced: |
Avicenna, Yahya ibn Adi,
Abu Sulayman Sijistani, Shahab al-Din Suhrawardi, Ibn Bajjah, Mulla Sadra[2] Al Amiri and Abu Hayyan al-Tawhidi[citation needed] |
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Abū Nasr Muhammad ibn al-Farakh al-Fārābi[1] (Persian:
ãÍãÏ ÝÇÑÇÈی) or Abū
Nasr al-Fārābi (in some sources, known
as Muhammad ibn Muhammad ibn
Tarkhan ibn Uzlagh al-Farabi[2]), also known in the West
as Alpharabius, Al-Farabi,
Farabi, and Abunaser
(c. 872[2] – between 14 December
950 and 12 January
951) is considered a
great polymath,
scientist
and philosopher in the history
of Persia and the Islamic world.
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Biography
The
existing variations in the basic facts about al-Farabi's
origins and pedigree indicate that they were not recorded during his lifetime
or soon thereafter by anyone with concrete information, but were based on
hearsay or guesses (as is the case with other contemporaries of al-Farabi). But what is known with certainty is that after
finishing his early school years in Farab and Bukhara, Farabi moved to Baghdad in 901
to pursue higher studies. He studied under a Christian cleric Yuhanna ibn Haylan
in Harran who
abandoned lay interests and engaged in his ecclesiastical duties, and he
remained in
There
is no consensus on the ethnic background of Farabi.
All sources on his ethnic background have been written at least 300 years after
Farabi and these few classical primary sources have
described his ethnicity differently. Among notable
scholars who have done extensive research on Farabi's
life and works is Prof. Dimitri Gutas
who has examined primary sources dealing with Farabi's
background.[1]
Persian origin
The
oldest known document regarding his background, written by the medieval Arab historian Ibn Abi Osaybe'a
(died in 1269), mentions that al-Farabi's father was
of Persian
descent.[4] Mohammad Ibn Mahmud Al-Shahruzi who lived around 1288 A.D. and has written an
early biography also has stated that Farabi hailed
from a Persian family.[5]
Ibn al-Nadim, a younger
contemporary of Farabi and a close friend of Yahya ibn Adi
(Farabi's closest and most successful student),
states Farabi's origins[1][6] to lie in Faryab in Khorasan ("men al-Faryab
men ardhµ Khorasan").
Faryab is also the name of a province in today's Afghanistan.
The Dehkhoda Dictionary -
based on Ibn Abi Osaybe'a's accounts - also calls him Persian
(ÝÇÑÓی ÇáãäÊÓÈý), mentioning the fact that his father was a
member of the Persian-speaking Samanid court of Central Asia.
The older Persian form Parab (Persian word
meaning cultivated land by streams) is given in the historical account Hodud al-'alam for his
birthplace. Farabi has in a number of his works
references and glosses in Persian
and Sogdian,[7][8]
pointing to an Iranian-speaking Central Asian origin. A Persian origin is also
discussed by Peter J. King[9]
and some other western sources[10]
as well a comprehensive source on Islamic Philosophy written in Arabic by the
Egyptian scholar Prof. Hanna Fakhuri.[11]
Turkic origin
The
oldest known reference to a possible Turkic
origin is given by the medieval historian Ibn Khallekān (died in
1282), who claimed that Farabi was born in the small
village of Wasij near Farab (in what is today Otrar,
Kazakhstan)
of Turkic parents, and in the following decades and centuries, many others coppied his work.[12]
But scholars criticize Ibn Khallekān's
statement, as it is only aimed to ridicule the earlier reports of Ibn Abi Osaybe'a,
and seems to have the sole purpose to prove that Farabi
was a Turk.[1] In this context, it is criticized that Ibn Khallekān was also the
first to use the additional nisba (surname) "al-Turk"
- a nisba Farabi
never had.[1] Ibn Khallekān's
statement also contradicts Ibn al-Nadim
and Yahya bin Adi, both
contemporaries of Farabi, who had reported that Farabi's birthplace was Faryab in
Khorasan. Ibn Khallekān's accounts are also partially contradicted
by the above mentioned fact that Farabi has in many
of his writings references and glosses in Persian, Sogdian,
and Greek, but not in Turkish.[1]
However,
aside from early Islamic sources and the mentioned controversies, a significant
number of sources[13]
as well as the Encyclopaedia Britannica[14]
consider al-Farabi to be of Turkic,
some even of Turkic Seljuq[15]
origin.
Contributions
Farabi made notable contributions to the fields of mathematics,
philosophy,
medicine and
music.
As a philosopher and Neoplatonist, he wrote rich commentary on Aristotle's work. Al-Farabi was also the first Muslim philosopher to develop a non-Aristotelian logic
. He discussed the topics of future contingents, the number and relation of the categories, the relation between logic and grammar, and non-Aristotelian forms of inference.[16] He is also credited for categorizing logic into two separate groups, the first being "idea" and the second being "proof."Farabi wrote books on sociology and
a notable book on music
titled Kitab al-Musiqa
(The Book of Music). He played and invented a varied number of musical instruments and his pure Arabian tone system is still used in Arabic
music.[17]
Perhaps, his most notable work is Al-Madina
al-fadila where he theorized an ideal state as in
Plato's Republic. Farabi is
also known for his early investigations into the nature of the existence of void in physics.[18]
Al-Farabi had great influence on science and philosophy for
several centuries, and was widely regarded to be second only to Aristotle in
knowledge (alluded to by his title of "the Second Teacher"). His
work, aimed at synthesis of philosophy and Sufism, paved the
way for Ibn Sina's
work.[19]
Al-Farabi saw religion as a symbolic rendering of truth, and,
like Plato, saw it
as the duty of the philosopher to provide guidance to the state. Influenced by
the writings of Aristotle, in The Ideas of the Citizens of the Virtuous
City and other books, he advanced the view that philosophy and revelation
are two different modes of approaching the same truth. [citation needed]
He
also mentioned Alexander the Great in his works.[citation needed]
Philosophical
Thought
The
main influence on al-Farabi's philosophy was the neo-Aristotelian
tradition of
Al-Farabi as well as Ibn Sina and Averroes have
been recognized as Peripatetics(al-Mashsha’iyun) or
rationalists(Estedlaliun) among Muslims.[23]
[24][25]
However he tried to gather the ideas of Plato and Aristotle in
his book "The gathering of the ideas of the two philosophers".[26]
According
to Adamson, his work was singularly directed towards the goal of simultaneously
reviving and reinventing the Alexandrian philosophical tradition, to which his
Christian teacher, Yuhanna b. Haylan belonged.
His success should be measured by the honorific title of "the second
master" of philosophy (Aristotle being the first), by which he was known.
Interestingly, Adamson also says that he does not make any reference to the
ideas of either al-Kindi or his contemporary, Abu
Bakr al-Razi, which
clearly indicates that he did not consider their approach to Philosophy as a
correct or viable one.[27]
Works
Metaphysics and
Cosmology
In
contrast to al-Kindi, who considered the subject of metaphysics to be
God, al-Farabi believed that it was concerned
primarily with being qua being (that is, being in of itself), and this
is related to God only to the extent that God is a principal of absolute being.
Al-Kindi's view was, however, a common misconception
regarding Greek philosophy amongst Muslim intellectuals at the time, and it was
for this reason that Avicenna remarked that he did not understand Aristotle's Metaphysics
properly until he had read a prolegomena written by al-Farabi.[28]
Al-Farabi's cosmology is essentially based upon three pillars:
Aristotelian metaphysics of causation, highly developed Plotinian
emanational cosmology and the Ptolemaic astronomy.[29]
In his model, the universe is viewed as a number of concentric circles; the
outermost sphere or "first heaven", the sphere of fixed stars,
Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, the Sun, Venus, Mercury and finally, the Moon. At the
centre of these concentric circles is the sub-lunar realm which contains the
material world.[30]
Each of these circles represent the domain of the secondary intelligences
(symbolized by the celestial bodies themselves), which act as causal intermediaries
between the First Cause (in this case, God) and the material world. Furthermore
these are said to have emanated from God, who is both their formal and
efficient cause. This departs radically from the view of Aristotle, who
considered God to be solely a formal cause for the movement of the spheres, but
by doing so it renders the model more compatible with the ideas of the
theologians.[31]
The
process of emanation begins (metaphysically, not temporally) with the First
Cause, whose principal activity is self-contemplation. And it is this
intellectual activity that underlies its role in the creation of the universe.
The First Cause, by thinking of itself, "overflows" and the
incorporeal entity of the second intellect "emanates" from it. Like
its predecessor, the second intellect also thinks about itself, and thereby
brings its celestial sphere (in this case, the sphere of fixed stars) into
being, but in addition to this it must also contemplate upon the First Cause,
and this causes the "emanation" of the next intellect. The cascade of
emanation continues until it reaches the tenth intellect, beneath which is the
material world. And as each intellect must contemplate both itself
and an increasing number of predecessors, each succeeding level of existence
becomes more and more complex. It should be noted that this process is based
upon necessity as opposed to will. In other words, God does not have a choice
whether or not to create the universe, but by virtue of His own existence, He
causes it to be. This view also suggests that the universe is eternal, and both
of these points were criticized by al-Ghazzali in his attack on the philosophers[32][33]
In his
discussion of the First Cause (or God), al-Farabi
relies heavily on negative theology. He says that it cannot be
known by intellectual means, such as dialectical division or definition,
because the terms used in these processes to define a thing constitute its
substance. Therefore if one was to define the First Cause, each of the terms
used would actually constitute a part of its substance and therefore
behave as a cause for its existence, which is impossible as the First
Cause is uncaused; it exists without being caused. Equally, he says it cannot
be known according to genus and differentia, as its substance and existence are
different from all others, and therefore it has no category to which it belongs.
If this were the case, then it would not be the First Cause, because something
would be prior in existence to it, which is also impossible. This would suggest
that the more philosophically simple a thing is, the more perfect it is. And
based on this observation, Adamson says it is possible to see the entire
hierarchy of al-Farabi's cosmology according to
classification into genus and species. Each succeeding level in this structure
has as its principal qualities multiplicity and deficiency, and it is this ever-increasing
complexity that typifies the material world. [34]
Epistemology and
Eschatology
Human
beings are unique in al-Farabi's vision of the
universe because they stand between two worlds: the "higher",
immaterial world of the celestial intellects and universal intelligibles,
and the "lower", material world of generation and decay; they inhabit
a physical body, and so belong to the "lower" world, but they also
have a rational capacity, which connects them to the "higher" realm.
Each level of existence in al-Farabi's cosmology is
characterized by its movement towards perfection, which is to become like the
First Cause; a perfect intellect. Human perfection (or "happiness"),
then, is equated with constant intellection and contemplation.[35]
Al-Farabi divides intellect into four categories: potential,
actual, acquired and the Agent. The first three are the different states of the
human intellect and the fourth is the Tenth Intellect (the moon) in his emanational cosmology. The potential intellect represents
the capacity to think, which is shared by all human beings, and the actual
intellect is an intellect engaged in the act of thinking. By thinking, al-Farabi means abstracting universal intelligibles
from the sensory forms of objects which have been apprehended and retained in
the individual's imagination.[36]
This
motion from potentiality to actuality requires the Agent Intellect to act upon
the retained sensory forms; just as the Sun illuminates the physical world to
allow us to see, the Agent Intellect illuminates the world of intelligibles to allow us to think.[37]
This illumination removes all accident (such as time, place, quality)
and physicality from them, converting them into primary intelligibles,
which are logical principals such as "the whole is greater than the
part". The human intellect, by its act of intellection, passes from
potentiality to actuality, and as it gradually comprehends these intelligibles, it is identified with them (as according to
Aristotle, by knowing something, the intellect becomes like it).[38]
Because the Agent Intellect knows all of the intelligibles,
this means that when the human intellect knows all of them, it becomes
associated with the Agent Intellect's perfection and is known as the acquired
Intellect.[39]
While
this process seems mechanical, leaving little room for human choice or
volition, Reisman says that al-Farabi
is committed to human voluntarism.[40]
This takes place when man, based on the knowledge he has acquired, decides
whether to direct himself towards virtuous or unvirtuous
activities, and thereby decides whether or not to seek true happiness. And it
is by choosing what is ethical and contemplating about what constitutes the
nature of ethics, that the actual intellect can become
"like" the active intellect, thereby attaining perfection. It is only
by this process that a human soul may survive death, and live on in the
afterlife.[41][42]
According
to al-Farabi, the afterlife is not the personal
experience commonly conceived of by religious traditions such as Islam and Christianity.
Any individual or distinguishing features of the soul are annihilated after the
death of the body; only the rational faculty survives (and then, only if it has
attained perfection), which becomes one with all other rational souls within
the agent intellect and enters a realm of pure intelligence.[43]
Henry
Corbin compares this eschatology with that of the Ismaili
Neo-Platonists, for whom this process initiated the next grand cycle of the
universe.[44] However, Deborah Black mentions we have cause to be
skeptical as to whether this was the mature and developed view of al-Farabi, as later thinkers such as Ibn Tufayl, Averroes and Ibn Bajjah would assert that
he repudiated this view in his commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics,
which has been lost to modern experts.[45]
Psychology, the Soul and Prophetic
Knowledge
In his
treatment of the human soul, al-Farabi draws on a
basic Aristotelian outline, which is informed by the commentaries of later
Greek thinkers. He says it is composed of four faculties: The appetitive
(the desire for, or aversion to an object of sense), the sensitive (the
perception by the senses of corporeal substances), the imaginative (the
faculty which retains images of sensible objects after they have been
perceived, and then separates and combines them for a number of ends), and the rational,
which is the faculty of intellection.[46]
It is the last of these which is unique to human beings and distinguishes them
from plants and animals. It is also the only part of the soul to survive the
death of the body. Noticeably absent from these scheme are internal senses,
such as common sense, which would be discussed by later philosophers such as Avicenna and Averroes. [47][48]
Special
attention must be given to al-Farabi's treatment of
the soul's imaginative faculty, which is essential to his interpretation
of prophethood and prophetic knowledge. In addition
to its ability to retain and manipulate sensible images of objects, he gives
the imagination the function of imitation. By this he means the capacity to
represent an object with an image other than its own. In other words, to
imitate "x" is to imagine "x" by associating it with
sensible qualities that do not describe its own appearance. This extends the
representative ability of the imagination beyond sensible forms and to include
temperaments, emotions, desires and even immaterial intelligibles
or abstract universals, as happens when, for example, one associates
"evil" with "darkness".[49][50]
The prophet, in addition to his own intellectual capacity, has a very strong
imaginative faculty, which allows him to receive an overflow of intelligibles from the agent intellect (the tenth intellect
in the emanational cosmology). These intelligibles are then associated with symbols and images,
which allow him to communicate abstract truths in a way that can be understood
by ordinary people. Therefore what makes prophetic knowledge unique is not its
content, which is also accessible to philosophers through demonstration and
intellection, but rather the form that it is given by the prophet's
imagination.[51][52]
Practical Philosophy (Ethics and Politics)
The
practical application of philosophy is a major concern expressed by al-Farabi in many of his works, and while the majority of his
philosophical output has been influenced by Aristotelian thought, his practical
philosophy is unmistakably based on that of Plato.[53]
In a similar manner to Republic (Plato), al-Farabi
emphasizes that philosophy is both a theoretical and practical discipline;
labeling those philosophers who do not apply their erudition to practical
pursuits as "futile philosophers". The ideal society, he says, is one
directed towards the realization of "true happiness" (which can be
taken to mean philosophical enlightenment) and as such, the ideal philosopher
must hone all the necessary arts of rhetoric and poetics to communicate
abstract truths to the ordinary people, as well as having achieved
enlightenment himself.[54]
Al-Farabi compares the philosopher's role in relation
to society with a physician in relation to the body; the body's health is
affected by the "balance of its humours"
just as the city is determined by the moral habits of its people. The philosopher's
duty, he says, is to establish a "virtuous" society by healing the
souls of the people, establishing justice and guiding them towards "true
happiness".[55]
Of
course, al-Farabi realizes that such a society is
rare and will require a very specific set of historical circumstances in order
to be realized, which means very few societies will ever be able to attain this
goal. He divides those "vicious" societies, which have fallen short
of the ideal "virtuous" society, into three categories: ignorant,
wicked and errant. Ignorant societies have, for whatever reason, failed
to comprehend the purpose of human existence, and have supplanted the pursuit
of happiness for another (inferior) goal, whether this be wealth, sensual
gratification or power. It is interesting to note that democratic societies
also fall into this category, as they too lack any guiding principal. Both wicked
and errant societies have understood the true human end, but they have
failed to follow it. The former because they have willfully
abandoned it, and the latter because their leaders have deceived and misguided
them. Al-Farabi also makes mention of
"weeds" in the virtuous society; those people who try to undermine
its progress towards the true human end. [56]
Whether or not al-Farabi actually intended to outline a political programme in his writings remains a matter of dispute amongst academics. Henry Corbin, who considers al-Farabi to be a crypto-Shi'ite
, says that his ideas should be understood as a "prophetic philosophy" instead of being interpreted politically.[57] On the other hand, Charles Butterworth contends that nowhere in his work does al-Farabi speak of a prophet-legislator or revelation (even the word philosophy is scarcely mentioned), and the main discussion that takes place concerns the positions of "king" and "statesmen".[58]. Occupying a middle position is David Reisman, who like Corbin believes that al-Farabi did not want to expound a political doctrine (although he does not go so far to attribute it to Islamic Gnosticism either). He argues that al-Farabi was using different types of society as examples, in the context of an ethical discussion, to show what effect correct or incorrect thinking could have.[59] Lastly, Joshua Parens argues that al-Farabi was slyly asserting that a pan-Islamic society could not be made, by using reason to show how many conditions (such as moral and deliberative virtue) would have to be met, thus leading the reader to conclude that humans are not fit for such a society. [60]